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INCENTIVES AND CAREERS IN
ORGANIZATIONS
ABSTRACT
This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature: incentive pay and
careers in organizations. In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and evidence
related to the classic agency model, which emphasizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentives.
I then offer econometric and case-study evidence suggesting that this classic model ignores several
crucial issues and sketch new models that begin to analyze these issues. In the discussion of careers
in organizations, I begin by summarizing evidence on wages and positions using panel data within
firms. This evidence is sparse and far-flung (drawn from industrial relations, organizational
behavior, and sociology, as well as from labor economics); I identify ten basic questions that merit
more systematic investigation. Turning to theory, I describe building-block models that address one
or a few pieces of evidence, but focus on more recent models that address broad patterns of evidence.
Robert Gibbons





An outsider might be surprised to learn that mdem labor economics has little to say
about activities inside firms. After all, isn’ t work (i.e., what workers do once they go through a
fro’s doors) one of the field’s most natural areas of inquiry?
Let’s take stock. Several research areas in labor economics end precisely when an
employment relationship begins: unemployment duration and labor-force participation are
examples, and even labor demand typically fmuses on how many workers should be hired rather
than on what the firm should then do with them. Other research areas in labor economics reduce
the employment relationship to a wage, or at most a wage profile: on-the-job search, labor
supply, and human-capital models of earnings, for example. Even research on the return to
seniority more often focuses on econometric issues than on what actually happens during an
employment relationship; similarly, research on training more often focuses on pre-employment
government-sponsored programs than on skill development in firms. Simply put, modem labor
economics contains little work on work.
The situation may k changing. In this paper I describe theory and evidence on two
aspects of some employment relationships: incentive pay and careers in organizations. 1 Most of
the theory I describe is recent, emphasizing games and contracts more than the workhorse
theories of lakr economics in the 1970s and ‘80s, human capital and search. Much of the
evidence is also new, at least in the sense of not having been pm of the published discourse in
labor economics over the last few decades. This same evidence is also old, however, both in the
sense of sometimes referring to events long past (sharecropping in 1910 or a machine shop in
Chicago around 1950, for example) and in the sense of sometimes being fairly well-known
outside labor economics.
Because there is not much empirical work on employment relationships in labor
economics, I draw on other fields-including accounting, human resource management,
industrial relations, and organizational sociology—whenever my exposure allows.
Unfortunately, data on employment relationships often must be collectd virtually by hand.
Doing the hard work of data collection and utilizing the rnicroeconometric expertise that has
become the hallmark of labor economics are crucial next steps for this emerging literature. In the
meantime, I limit discussion of theory to classes of models that seem likely to deliver empirical
implications (or, better still, have already done so).
1 Other aspectsofemploymentrelationshipsalsodeserveattention,such as job design, skill development,and
participativedecision-m&ing.Researchon these issues seems less ready for summary and assessment, but
intriguingtheoryandevidencehas begun to emerge: sm Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991), Itoh (1992), Prendergmt (1995), and Meyer, Olsen, and Torsvik (forthcoming) for theory and Osterman
(1994, 1995), Pencavel and Craig (1994), and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1995) for evidence.2
1. Incentive Pay
There are many senses in which pay maybe linked to performance. Perhaps the simplest
case is where workers’ productivities differ and wages equal marginal products. More often,
however, the phrase “pay for performance” connotes the provision of incentives. In this section I
discuss the dominant model of incentive contracting, the principal-agent model.z
Several of the main issues can be illustrated quite simply in the context of sharecropping.
Three standard sharecropping contracts are: wage labor, which imposes no risk on the agent;
crop sharing, which shares risk between the principal and the agent; and fixed-payment land
rental, which leaves the agent with all the crop risk. The classic agency model, which
emphasizes the tradeoff between incentives and insurance, implies that where there is greater
crop risk there should also be more risk-sharing-more used of fixed wages and crop sharing
rather than land rental. Higgs (1973) presents evidence consistent with this prediction: for both
cotton and com, and for two empirical measures of risk, a cross-sectional analysis of the
southern states of the US for 1910 finds more risk-sharing in states with greater crop risk. But
Alston and Higgs (1982) document that Higgs’s comforting finding obscures both (1) enormous
variation within each of these three main classes of contracts and (2) significant variation across
the three classes of contracts even after controlling for risk.
Both the organization and the spirit of this section parallel this research on sharecropping.
Parallel to Higgs’s paper, I begin by summarizing the theory and evidence on the classic agency
model. Parallel to Alston and Higgs’s paper, I then explore five new issues, in the hope of
accounting for some of the enormous richness in incentive contacting that the classic agency
model simply chalks up as unexplained variation. I conclude that risk is a significant issue in
incentive contracting, but that the principal-agent literature’s initial obsession with its
consequences distracted us from a host of equally important issues.
A. The Much-Studied Tradeofbetween Incentives and Insurance
The classic mdel in agency theory involves an agent who takes an action (a) to produce
output of value y. The principal owns the output but contracts to share it with the agent by paying
a wage contingent on output, w(y). There is noise in the production function, so the agent’s
output is uncertain. Furthermore, the agent is risk-averse. Paying a constant wage, independent
2 For lack of space, I ignore two smaller literatures on incentives: efficiency-wage and deferred-payment models,
which diffa from the principal-agent model in that wages do not vary with performance. In an efficiency-wage
model, a fm pays a high wage to all workers but subsequently fires those whose ~rformarrce is too low; w
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for thmry and Capelli and Chauvin (1991), Krueger (1991), and Abowd, Kramm, and
Margolis (1994) for evidence. In a deferred-payment model, workers are again f~ for poor performance, but now3
of y, would provide the agent with full insurance but no incentive; selling the agent the fm for a
fee of F (or, equivalently, paying the agent w(y) = y - F) would provide the agent with full
incentives but no insurance.
An intuitive closed-form solution can be derived in the linear-normal-exponential case.
The production function is linear, y = a + e, where e is a normally distributed noise term with
zero mean and variance &. The incentive contract is linear, w(y) =s + by, where the intercept s
is the salary and the slope b is the bonus rate. The agent’s utility function is U(x) = -e-n, where r
>0 is the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion and x = w - c(a) is the agent’s net payoff—
the realized wage minus the convex disutility of action c(a). The principal is risk-neutral and so
seeks to maximize the expected value of profit, y - w.
Given a contract w(y)= s + by, the agent’s problem is to choose an action to maximize
the expected utility
,e-r[$+b(u+E)-c(U)]~( e)~E = _e-r[s+bu-c(u)] ~e-~~&~(E)~E,
&
where $(E) denotes
solves c’(a) = b. The
E
the normal density function. The agent’s optimal action, denoted a*(b),
agent’s maximized expected utility is therefore
–e
–r(s+ba*(b)–c[a* (b)]) ~e–rb& p{e)~e = _e-r[s+ba*(b)-c[a* (b)]-(1/z)rb202] ,
E
so the agent’s certainty equivalent is
cE(s, b)= s+ bd(b) – c[~b)] – ~rb202.
2
That is, the agent’s certainty equivalent from the contract w(y) = s + by is the expected wage
minus the cost of effort minus the cost of bearing risk. The principal’s expected profit is
ErI(s, b) = (1 – b)~b) – s,
so the total surplus (i.e., the sum of the principal’s expectd profit and the agent’s certainty
equivalent) depends on b but not ons:
cE(s, b) + ErI(s, b) = Mb) – c[~b)] – ‘rb’a’ = Ts(b)
L
We can now determine the efficient contract slope, denoted b*: it is the slope that
maximizes the total surplus TS(b). If the parties agreed to a contract with some other slope then
forfeit higher wages later in their career (or after retirement, through a pension); sw bear (1979) for theory and
Goldin (1986), Hutchens (1987), and Margolis (1995) for evidence.both parties could be made ktter off by switching to a contract with slope b* and choosing an
appropriate value ofs to distribute the increased total surplus. The first-order condition for b* is




This result makes sense. Since r, <, and c“ are positive, b* is between zero (full insurance) and
one (full incentives). Furthermore, b* is smaller if the agent is more risk-averse (r is higher) or
there is more uncertainty in production (~ is higher) or marginal disutility increases more quickly
(c” is higher).
This solution to the classic mtiel is tidy but flawed: Mirrlees (1974) showed that the best
linear contract, w = s + b*y, is inferior to various non-linear contracts. In particular, a step-
function con~act (where the agent earns w,{ if y 2 yObut w~ < W1lif y < Yo)can pefiorm very
well, approaching the twin goals of full incentives and full insurance in the limit (as yOand w~
decrease in appropriate fashion, so that the agent almost surely receives WIIand yet has incentives
from fear of w~). Mirrlees’s result prompted a decade of research on how the optimal contract
depends on the details of the utility function and the condition distribution of outpu t given the
agent’s action. In brief, this work showed that the optimal contract in the classic agency model is
extremely sensitive to these details. In particular, the optimal contract is linear only under very
special assumptions about the utility function and the conditional distribution of output.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) reinterpreted the classic agency model so as to rescue
linear contracts. Rather than a single action (a) that influences a single outcome (y), Holmstrom
and Milgrom envision a sequence of actions (say, one per day, over the course of a year)
influencing a corresponding sequence of outcomes. There are no connections across days (i.e.,
the action ~ on day t affects that day’s outcome, y,, but has no influence on any other day’s
outcome) and all past outcomes are observed kfore the next day’s action is chosen. The output y
from the classic model is interpreted as the aggregate output for the year in the sequential-action
model: y = Xy,.
Suppose that each day’s outcome takes one of two values—say L or H. Then a one-tiy
incentive contract is simply a pair of wages: w~ is paid if the outcome is H; w~ if L. Suppose that
the agent labors under the same one-day contract for all the days of the year. If there are T days
in the year and the agent produces H on N of these days then the aggregate output for the year is
y = TL + N(H - L) and the aggregate wage for the year is w = Tw~ + N(wII - w~). Thus, N = (y -
TL)/(H -L) and




That is, if the agent labors under the same one-day contract throughout the year then the
aggregate wage is a linear function of the aggregate output. Given several other assumptions,
Holmstrom and Milgrom show not only that it is optimal for the agent to labor under a constant
one-day contract but also that the optimal slope in the aggregate representation of this contract
(i.e., w =s + by) is b*, just as in the classic agency model.
In my view, the main contribution of this Holmstrom-Milgrom model is not that it
justifies linear con~acts (by imposing quite strong assumptions), but rather that it alerts us to
gaming as a natural consequence of non-linetity. For example, a step-function contract of the
kind studied by Mirrlees (in the classic one-action model) induces no effort once the agent’s
aggregate output to date passes the hurdle yO(in the daily-action model). More generally, if the
incentive contract for the year is a non-linear function of yem-end aggregate output then the
worker’s incentives change from day to day, depending on the aggregate output to date. A
growing body of evidence is consistent with this prediction: see Healy (1985) on bonus plans
with ceilings and floors, Asch (1990) and Oyer (1995) on bonuses tied to quotas, Chevalier and
Ellison (1995) on the effects of even modest convexities in smooth pay plans, and Ehrenberg and
Bognanno (1990) on performance across rounds in professional golf tournaments.3
There is other evidence more closely related to the classic agency model. One basic
question is “Does pay vary with performance?” For example, by the early 1980s, the receivd
wisdom was that the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOS) in large US firms was
closely related to the firm’s size but unrelated (or even negatively related!) to its stock-market
performance. Murphy (1985) noted, however, that if big firms pay higher salaries but small
firms have superior stcck-market performance (the “small-ftrm effect” from finance) then a
cross-section regression of cash compensation (salary plus bonus) on stock-market performance
will be biased downwards, unless there are adequate controls for firm heterogeneity. Murphy
found that including fixed effects in a panel-data model produces a strong statistical relationship
between CEO pay and stock-market performance.4
A second basic question is ‘Do incentives matter?” In brief, the answer is “Yes.” For
example, the evidence summarized above on the effects of non-linear incentive plans motivates
this conclusion. Others have studied the proposition that steeper slopes create stronger incentives:
3 Incentive con~cE obviously exist outside as well as inside employment relationships, golf tournaments
being just one example. In trying to understand incentive contracts inside firms, I will sometimes tiw on
examples from outside, Much work remains to be done on how incentive contracts differ (by choice or by
constraint) depending on whether they are inside or outside firms; w Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker,
Gibbons, and Murphy (1996) for initial explorations of this issue.
4 Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimate that the pay-for-performance slope for the CEO of a typical large US firm
is at most b = .003. Jensen and Murphy argue that such a pay-for-performance relation is statistically but not
economically significant, whera Haubnch (1994) argues that plausible parameter values in the classic agency
model can yield an efficient slope of this magnitude,6
a*(b) increases with b. Lazear (1996), for example, finds that the output of workers installing
automobile windshields increased after a switch from hourly wages to piece rates.5 Abowd
(1990) and Kahn and Sherer (1990) estimate the sensitivity of managerial pay to current
performance and then estimate the effect of this sensitivity on subsequent performance.G The
results are generally consistent with the theory but are somewhat noisy, in keeping with having
to estimate rather than observe the relation between pay and performance. Gaynor and Getiler
(1995) use data on medical partnerships, where the sharing rule is included in the data but was
chosen by the partners. Their instrumental-variable estimates again are consistent with the simple
proposition that incentives matter. Finally, there is evidence that investors believe that incentives
matter: Bnckley, Bhagat, and Lease (1985) find that there is a significant increase in a firm’s
stock price (net of any movement in the market as a whole) when the firm announces a stock-
based compensation plan; Tehranian and Waegelein (1985) present analogous evidence for
announcements of accounting-based bonus contracts.
There is also evidence related to the main idea behind the classic agency model-the
tradeoff between incentives and insurance. For example, there is evidence that the slope falls as
risk or risk-aversion increases. As noted earlier, Higgs (1973) presents evidence from
sharecropping in 1910 that the slope falls as risk increases; Garen (1994) offers similar evidence
for CEOS of large US firms, Gaynor and Gertler (1995) find that the slope of the sharing rule in
medical pmtnerships falls as the partners’ risk-aversion increases.
The tradeoff between insurance and incentives produces further predictions in a richer
model with multiple performance measures, as follows. Suppose there is a second performance
measure, z = a + V, where v is a normally distributed noise term possibly correlated with &.
(Theoretical and empirical work in accounting often interprets y as the change in the firm’s stock-
market value and z as the firm’s accounting earnings, but many other interpretations are
possible.) Consider the contract w = s + by + dz. Holmstrom (1979) shows that the optimal
con~act uses both performance measures (i. e., b* # O and d* # O) unless one is a sufficient
5 Even this seemingly simple comparison raises several issues. Firsl, ou[put wm not zero kfore the
imposition of piece rates, suggesting that monitoring and/or efficiency wages should k included in lhe theoretical
and empirical analyses. Smond, as Lazear (1986a) and Brown (1992) analyze, high-productivity workers may prefer
piece rates to salaries, so the switch to pime rates may change the composition of the workforce; fortunately,
Lazear (1996) has data on individual workers over time. Third, and ~rhaps most important, many piece-rate plans
eventually run afoul of the “ratchet eff~t” described in the next sub-section.
6 Bmause the agent’s action is unobsemable, empirical work cannot directly test whether a*(b) increases with b,
and so relies on either performance (y) or profit (n = y - w) as a proxy for the agent’s action. Lazear uses
performanc~ Abowd uses various forms of profit; and Kahn and Sherer use numerical prforrnance ratings a-
by supervisors (which are more like y than like n, provided that supervisors are not judging performance relative
to wages). The distinction betwwn performance and profit affects the interpretation of the evidence. If observations
on b were randomly sprintdcd near b* (say, due to small mistakes) lhen a*(b) would increase with b, so E@)
would increase with b, but E(m)would be locally constant, because TS(b) is maximized at b*. On the other hand,
if variations in b were due to (say) unmeasured variation in risk or risk-aversion then both E(y) and E(n) would
increase in b.7
statistic for the other. That is, d* = O only if z contains no additional information about the
agent’s action beyond what is contained in y (i.e., Z= Y+$, Orp=E+$, Where @iS
independent of c); likewise, b* = Oonly if y contains no additional information beyond z (i.e., y
= z + $, or E = u + $, where $ is independent of ~). In Holmstrom’s model, therefore,
performance measures are simply signals about the agent’s action, and a signal is not useful if it
conveys no incremental information.
Some performance measures come from outside the firm, such as from other firms in the
same industry. Consider n firms, each subject to a common shock (6) and an idiosyncratic shock
(&i).Suppose yi = ai + f3+ &i, where (Q, El, .... en) me independent normal noise terms. Let zi
denote the average of then-1 other fins’ outputs (Yj). Then the pure own-performance contract
Wi = s + byi subjects the agent to two noise terms, t3 and Ei, whereas the pure relative-
performance contract W1= s + b(yl - z]) eliminates 6 but subjects the agent to &iand to the average
of the n-1 other idiosyncratic error terms (Ej). Holmstrom (1982a) shows that the efficient
contract is wl = s + byl - dzi, where b* > d*> O. That is, the efficient contract reflects a tradeoff
between eliminating the risk from (3(through the pure relative-performance contract) and avoiding
the risk from the average of then-1 other error terms (through a pure own-performance contract).
If the variance of 6 is small then it is not worth introducing the risk from then-1 other error terms
so d* is close to zero; if the variance of 6 is large then it is important that the contract filter out t3,
even at the cost of introducing risk from the other error terms, so d* is close to b*.
Antle and Smith (1986) look for evidence of relative performance evaluation in CEO pay.
Using data on 39 firms in three 2-digit industries, they find weak support for the theory, even
though they carefully compute the correlation in “output” for each pair of firms, Gibbons and
Murphy (1990) use a less-sophisticated approach but a much larger dataset, including data on
pay and performance from 1000 firms, with performance comparisons computed from data on
11,000 firms. Gibbons and Murphy find stronger support for the theory: CEO pay depends on
the firm’s stock-market performance relative to the market as a whole and (additionally) on the
firm’s stock-market performance relative to its 1-digit industry. Janakiraman, Lambert, and
Larcker (1992) estimate sepaate regressions for each of 554 fms (as opposed to the pooled
regression in Gibbons and Murphy). The mean of the firm-specific estimates in Janakiraman,
Lambert, and Larcker is similar to the pooled coefficient in Gibbons and Murphy.7
7 Antle-Smith, Gibbons-Murphy, and Janakiraman-Lambcrt-Larcker also examine the effect of accounting
earnings on CEO pay, again relative to the market as a whole and the fii’s industry. They all find little evidence
of relative performance evaluation involving accounting earnings. Sloan (1993) suggests why, by showing that
market-wide movements in earnings are not a major source of noise in earnings. Sloan also finds that mings are
closely correlated with the fum’s stock-market performance relative to the market as a whole. That is, an own-
performance contract based on the f~m’s earnings could have the effect of a relative-~rformance contract breed on
own and market stock movements.8
In sum, there is a large body of theory and evidence related to the classic agency model.
The theory has developed several insights, such as the role of linear contracts in deterring gaming
and the interpretation of performance measures as signals of the agent’s action. The evidence is
broadly consistent with both the basic theory and its extension to multiple performance measures.
But the literature does not explain (or even hint at) why paying for performance is so problematic
for many fins.
B. Complications in Real Incentive Contracts
The main idea behind the classic agency model is that there is a tradeoff between
incentives and insurance, but the most striking single fact about real attempts to tie pay to
performance is that it is a tricky business. The following examples are all t~ typical:
At the H.J. Heinz Company, division managers received bonuses only if earnings
increased from the prior year. The managers delivered consistent earnings growth by
manipulating the timing of shipments to customers and by prepaying for services not yet
received, both at some cost to the firm (Post and Goodpaster, 1981), At Bausch &
Lomb, the hurdle for a bonus was higher, often entailing double-digit earnings growth.
Again, managers met their targets in ways that were not obviously in the best long-run
interest of the firm (e.g., over half a million pairs of “sold” sunglasses were discovered
in a warehouse in Hong Kong; Maremont, 1995). At Dun & Brads~eet, salespeople
earned no commission unless the customer bought a larger subscription to the firm’s
credit-report services than in the previous year. In 1989, the company faced millions of
dollars in lawsuits following chages that its salespeople deceivd customers into buying
larger subscriptions by fraudulently overstating their historical usage (Roberts, 1989). In
1992, Sears abolished the commission plan in its auto-repair shops, which paid
mechanics based on the profits from repairs authorized by customers. Mechanics misled
customers into authorizing unnecessary repairs, leading California officials to prepare to
close Sears’ auto-repair business statewide (Patterson, 1992).
In brief, “business history is littered with fms that got what they paid for” (Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy, 1994: 1125).s
8 Firms are not the only ones who get what they pay for—governments do, too. Anderson, Burkhauser, and
Raymond (1993) offer evidenw of cream-skimming in the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA): lhe program’s
goals are to reduce an individual’s unemployment and incrae the individurd’s earnings, but program operators m
paid basal on the measured unemployment and earnings of program participants, so operators have an incentive to
enroll participants who would have had short unemployment and high earnings without training. Using cross-state
variation in incentive intensity, Cragg (1995) finds that cream-skimming increases when incentives are stronger,
but so do the outcomes that the program is intended to indu~edu~ unemployment and inc~ti earnings
conditional on the characteristics of those enrolled.9
I find it hard to relate the classic agency model to this evidence (and the larger body of
evidence it represents). First, much of the evidence concerns non-linear contracts, whereas the
classic model began with (and has recently returned to) linear contracts. Second, I see no
necessary role for risk-aversion in this evidence, whereas in the classic model the only reason to
limit incentives is to provide insurance. Third, and most important, the performance measures
used in these real incentive contracts differ from those envisioned in the classic model, as I
describe below. In this sub-section, therefore, I abandon the classic model, turning instead to
five other issues in incentive connecting—performance measurement, implicit contracts, labor
mobility, the ratchet effect, and career concerns. To emphasize that these five issues are
departures from the classic model, I assume throughout this sub-section that the agent is risk-
neumal. For lack of space, I give only brief attention to labor mobility, the ratchet effect, and
career concerns; I focus on performance measurement and implicit contracts because I klieve
that together they offer an important complement to the classic agency model.
1) Performance Measurement.” I lack the information to assess whether the incentive plans
at Heinz, Bausch & hmb, Dun & Bradstreet, and Sears were mistakes (as opposed to kst
responses to tough environments), but some of my colleagues in organizational behavior (OB)
are less reticent. Kerr’s (1975) classic title conveys his field’s judgment: “On the Foil y of
Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.” Kerr’s paper is so well known in OB that it has earned a
place in the canonical MBA core course on organizations; in econontics, in contrast, until recently
there was no model that could even express Kerr’s idea, not to mention evaluate or extend it.
Fortunately, Holrnstrom and Milgrom (199 1) and Baker (1992) now offer simple models
of such distortionary performance measurement, Both emphasize the distinction between the
agent’s total contribution to fm value (henceforth denoted y) and the agent’s measured
perfomlance (henceforth p). Even well-informed insiders may find it extremely difficult to assess
an agent’s total contribution to firm value, because total contribution includes aspects of
performance such as the effects of the agent’s actions on co-workers and the long-inn effects of
the agent’s current actions. Furthermore, to enforce a contract contingent on the agent’s total
contribution, the p~ies would have to specify ex ante how y is to be measurd ex post (so that a
court would know what to measure if called in to enforce the contract).
These difficulties ~e assumed away in the classic agency model: the agent’s total
contribution is called “output,” as though it could simply be counted at the end of the conmact
period, and contracts such as w = s + by are assumed to k trivial to write and enforce. The
classic model may capture some employment relationships, where there are few interactions
among co-workers and few long-run effects of current actions, Lazear’s (1996) study of piece
rates paid to workers installing auto windshields may be one example; more generally, Brown10
(1990) finds that piece rates are more likely to be used in jobs with a narrow set of routines than
in jobs with a variety of duties.
In a vast array of jobs, however, the Holmstrom-Milgrom and Baker distinction between
total contribution and measured performance seems crucially important. For example, Eccles and
Crane (1988) describe how investment banks deliver a substantial fraction of a trader’s
compensation through a subj~tively determined bonus, even though many objective aspects of
the individual’s petiormance are easily measured on a daily basis. Similarly, Burtis and Gabarro
(1995) offer a fictitious but persuasive account of the difficulties of performance evaluation in a
law firm: nine objective measures paint a narrow and distorted picture (even when combined with
four subjective assessments). Evaluating the performance of almost any manager or professional
worker seems likely to involve similar issues—for example, see Greene and Schlesinger (1992)
on incentive pay in a cable television firm. Finally, the recent enthusiasm for empowerment,
participation, and self-managed teams suggests that difficulties in performance evaluation may
become increasingly important for non-managerial workers as well.
Baker models the worker’s contribution to firm value as y = Ga+ E, whereas measured
performance is p = ~a + v. As in the classic model, Eand v are noise terms (independent of 6, V,
and each other), but B and L are features of the environment that are privately observed by the
worker before choosing an action. As motivated above, Baker assumes that a contract contingent
on y cannot be enforced, so the firm is reduced to contracting on p, through the linear contract w
= s + bp. Because the agent’s utility, w - c(a), depends on p, the agent will be induced to take
large actions when alp/da (i.e., y) is large; because the firm’s profit, y - w, depends importantly
on y, the firm will value large actions when dy/da (i.e., (3)is large. Hence Baker’s central insight:
a good petiormance measure induces the agent to do the right thing at the right time (i.e., to work
hard when doing so is valuable to the firm), so the quality of a performance measure depends on
the correlation between alp/da and dy/da. Thus, whereas the classic model views a performance
measure as a signal of the agent’s action, Baker focuses on the value of the actions that a contract
based on the performance measure will induce.
When measured performance omits important dimensions of total contribution, firms
understand that they will “get what they pay for,” and so may choose weak incentives in
preference to strong but frequently dysfunctional incentives. In Kerr’s terms, the Holmstrom-
Milgrom and Baker models explore environments in which it might be necessary to reward A
while hoping for B, but these mdels caution against over-rewarding A.g
9 Lazear (1989), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), and Dye (1992) issue similar cautions regwding unbridled use of
relative ~rformance evaluation: managers have incentives to choose a referem group they can beat, rather than
one that offers high returns; similarly, within a firm, managers have incentives to sabotage the performances of
co-workers as well m to improve their own performances.11
2) Implicit Con[racts: A worker’s total contribution to firm value may be impossible for a
court to measure using a method specified ex ante, but well-informed insiders may nonetheless
agree ex post on a particular worker’s conrnbution (or at least on an estimate of this
contribution). The great advantage of such ex post settling up is that the parties can take into
account events that occurred during the contract period that were not foreseen (or were not
articulated) ex ante. Thus, it might be possible for the worker and the firm to use an “implicit”
contract (i.e., an understanding backed by the parties’ reputations instead of law) based on total
contribution (y) rather than an “explicit” contract backed by a court but based on distotiionary
performance measures (p). For example, the fm might promise to pay a bonus if the worker’s
total contribution exceeds a critical level. The problem is that the fm will be tempted to renege,
pocketing the worker’s contribution and saving the bonus.
Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) model such implicit contracts as
repeated-game equilibria. In these models, the fm chooses not to renege only if the present
value of the ongoing relationship outweighs the immediate gain from reneging. For example,
suppose that y can be either L or H, and suppose that the firm pays a salary of S at the beginning
of the period and promises to pay a bonus of B at the end of the period if y = H. If the worker
believes that the fm will keep its promise then the prospect of the bonus induces an optimal
action a*(B) from the worker, which in turn determines the firm’s expected profit per period
from keeping its promise, En(S,B).
Suppose that the worker will leave the fm if the fm reneges on a bonus. (Stewart’s
(1993) account of the rupture of the subjwtive bonus plan at the investment bank First Boston
suggests how difficult it is for a firm to regain its workers’ trust after it is perceived to have
reneged on an implicit contract.) If the worker produces y = H then the fm can either pay the
bonus, resulting in a payoff of H - S - B this period and a payoff of En(S ,B) in all future
periods, or renege on the bonus, resulting in a payoff of H - S this period but the loss of the
worker thereafter. For simplicity, normalize the firm’s payoff after reneging to zero, perhaps
from employing a new worker at a wage equal to productivity. Then, given an interest rate r, the
present value from paying the bonus exceds the present value from reneging if
H–s–B+~EH(s, B)2H–s+~. o,
r r
or En(S ,B) 2 rB. Thus, a decrease in the profitabilityy of the ongoing relationship may wreck an
implicit contract; the collapse of the junk bond market may have been just such a precipitating
event at First Boston.
Some firms use both explicit and implicit contracts. Lincoln Electric, for example, is
well-known for its use of piece rates, but about half of a worker’s compensation rides on a
subjectively determined bonus @ast and Berg, 1975). Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994)12
explore the simultanaus use of explicit contracts
(e.g., w = s + bp) and implicit contracts based on
based on distortionary performance measures
total contribution (e. g., W = S + By, so that
total compensation is w + W). One role of the explicit contract is to reduce the size of the
implicit-contract bonus that the fm could save by reneging; one role of the implicit contract is to
reduce the distortionary incentives created by the explicit contract. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
show that, under one set of circumstances, the two types of contract are complementary: if the
performance measure (p) becomes less distortionary (i.e., if the correlation between alp/da and
dy/da increases) then the explicit contract increases the profitability of the ongoing relationship,
thereby making it crdible for the firm to promise a larger bonus in the implicit contract. Under
the opposite circumstances, explicit contracts hinder implicit contracts: if the explicit contract
alone is sufficiently effmtive then the firm’s payoff after reneging is not zero but rather the
payoff from using the optimal explicit contract alone; as this payoff increases, it becomes more
tempting for the firm to renege on an implicit contract, reducing the bonus the firm can credibly
promise.
3) Labor Mobili@: One of the fundamental assumptions in labor economics is that
workers cannot be bound to firms. That is, firms may provide financial inducements for workers
to stay, but a contract stipulating that a worker must stay would not be upheld by a court (at least
in the US and similar settings). This assumption pervades the literature on wage determination,
from Becker’s (1962) analysis of general-purpose human capital to Harris and Holmstrom’s
(1982) and Beaudry and DiNardo’s (1991) analyses of incomplete insurance. The classic agency
model, on the other hand, makes the opposite assumption: once the worker has been induced to
sign the incentive contract, its eventual consequences can be enforced on the worker. The
following evidence from sharecropping suggests that labor mobility may be quite important in
incentive contracting, especially if one adopts the Holmstrom-Milgrom sequential-action
reinterpretation of the classic agency model.
Recall that Higgs (1973) found that states with higher crop risk have less risk-sharing in
their sharecropping contracts (i.e., more wage labor and less crop sharing and fixed-payment
land rental), but that Alston and Higgs (1982) found significant variation across the three classes
of conmact even after controlling for risk. Alston and Higgs argue that one important source of
this variation is the prospect of Iahr mobility. For example, during harvests when the price of
cotton was high, bidding wars for labor ensued. Hands paid as wage laborers had no incentive
to ignore tempting offers to move, whereas hands paid with crop sharing and hands renting the
land would forego their crop if they moved. Thus, in settings where risk considerations alone
would imply that wage labor is optimal, the addition of enforcement considerations might make
crop sharing efficient. (Crop sharing thus functions like a “hostage” in Williamson’s (1983)
analysis. ) Consistent with this argument, Alston (1981) finds that, holding risk and other factors13
constant, farmers closer to urban areas (i.e., sources of temporary labor that reduce the
likelihood and the effect of bidding wars) use wage labor more than either form of risk-sharing.
4) The ratchet effect: Lincoln Elmtric is well-known for its piece rates because it has
avoided both the infamous ratchet effect (where the fm reduces the piece rate if it learns that the
job can be done more easily than was at first thought) and its repercussion, output restriction
(where workers anticipate that the firm will ratchet the rate and so work slowly to prevent the
firm from discerning the true pace at which the job could be done). A large body of evidence
suggests that Lincoln is a rare exception. Clawson (1980:170) summarizes many case studies
and concludes that “employers insisted that they would never cut a price once it was set, yet
every employer did cut prices,” Mathewson (193 1) offers a huge collection of vignettes
concerning output resrnction, and Roy (1952) gives detailed evidence of carefully restricted
productivity in a machine shop.
To explore these qualitative accounts analytically, it seems natural to consider an
environment in which the workers have private information about the job’s difficulty and a
worker’s effort cannot be monitored. In a two-period mtiel of such an environment, Gibbons
(1987) shows that if neither the fm nor the worker can commit across periods (i.e., the fm
cannot commit in the fwst period to the second-period piece rate and the worker cannot commit in
the f~st period to remain with the firm for the second period) then both the ratchet effect and
output restriction are unavoidable: there is no quilibrium compensation scheme that induces
efficient effort.
Kanemoto and MacLeod (1991) and Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) study
environments that allow firms to avoid the ratchet effect (and so avoid output restriction as well).
Kanemoto and MacLeod analyze a two-period model where the worker’s output conveys
information about the worker’s ability, rather than about the job’s difficulty as in Gibbons. In the
Kanemoto-MacLeod model, competition for the worker’s services from the market of
prospective employers gives the worker confidence that the firm will match the market in the
second period. Carmichael and MacLeod explore a repeated-game (rather than a two-period)
model in which the future value of the ongoing relationship may allow the firm to commit. For
example, they describe mutual-monitoring arrangements among British cotton spinners in the
19th century in which piece rates were publicly posted and sanctions were administered (by other
firms!) against fms that cut rates.
5) Career Concerm: When a worker’s current performance affects the market’s belief
about the worker’s ability, and hence the worker’s future compensation, we say that the worker
has current incentives from “career concerns.” Fama (1980) suggested that career concerns could
eliminate the need for managerial incentive contracts, but Holmstrom (1982b) showed that, in the
absence of contracts, career concerns prduce an inefficient (but intuitive) pattern of effort over14
time: managers typically work too hard in early years (while the market is still assessing the
manager’s ability and the manager has a long time to reap the rewards of improving the market’s
beliefl and not hard enough in later years (when the market’s klief is hard to budge and the
manager has little time to go).
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) add incentive contracts (like those in the classic agency
model) to the Fama-Holmstrom model. Because caeer-concem incentives decline as the manager
approaches retirement, the slope of the optimal incentive contract increases, keeping total
incentives (roughly) constant. Gibbons and Murphy present evidence on CEO compensation
consistent with this prediction. Gompers and Lemer (1994) offer similar evidence for venture
capitalists.
C. New Dimensions
I have so far tried to make two points. First, risk matters in incentive contracting, but
focusing on risk alone yields a sterile perspective, Second, several promising new classes of
models have been developed recently, emphasizing aspects of real incentive contracting that are
orthogonal to the tradeoff between insurance and incentives. To conclude this section I briefly
consider three new issues: motivation, social comparison, and groups.
Baron (1988:494) describes the imagery of workers in economic mcdels of pay for
performance as “somewhat akin to Newton’s frost law of motion: employees remain in a state of
rest unless compelled to change that state by a stronger force impressed upon them—namely, an
optimal labor conhact.” Many psychologists subscribe to another view, based on the distinction
(and interaction) between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, Staw (1977) considers two extreme
cases: insufficient justification (i.e., low intrinsic rewards, say from a dull task, and no extrinsic
rewards) and oversufficient justification (i.e., high intrinsic rewards, say from an interesting
task, and high extrinsic rewards). Staw argues that those who choose to perform a task in the
insufficient-justification condition may come to klieve that the task is interesting, in order to
justify their behavior to themselves, whereas those in the oversufficient-justification condition
may mistakenly infer that continued participation is motivated by high extrinsic rewards and so
come to believe that the task is not interesting.
As a test of the insuficienc-justification hypothesis, Staw (1974) measured the attitudes
and the performance of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets both kfore and after they
learned their draft numbers. As predicted, those with draft numbers such that there was no risk
of being drafted (who therefore were engaged in dull tasks with no extrinsic rewards) showed
improved attitudes shut ROTC and even slightly enhanced performance. Staw (1977)
summarizes several experiments that suggest limits to the applicability of the oversufficienf-
justification hypothesis, such as that there should be no pre-existing norm for payment. These15
limits suggest that the oversufficient-justification effect will & unlikely to be central in
employment relationships, but might be important in voluntary organizations or with reference to
tasks in an employment relationship that are usually performed voluntarily.
Another prominent aspect of social psychology that kars on employment relationships is
social comparison theory (Vroom, 1968; Goodman, 1977). O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988)
apply this theory CEO pay; Frank (1985) studies other monomic applications. After controlling
for firm performance, sales, size, and industry effects (at something between the 1- and 2-digit
level), O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal find that CEO pay is significantly related to the average salary
of the outside directors (in their main jobs) and even more strongly related to the average salary
of the outside directors on the compensation committee. I would like to see this finding replicated
on richer cross-section data with finer industry controls, and on panel data with changes in board
composition. More generally, I think such findings from other fields should be pursued rather
than dismissed. 10
The issue of social comparison leads naturally to the issue of groups-another arena in
which economic thinking often diverges from social-psychological and sociological views.
Recent economic research on the effects of group incentive plans documents non-rnvial
productivity increases, such as Kruse (1993) on profit sharing and Jones and Kato (1995) on
employee stock-ownership plans. To an economist, these results raise the question of free-riding:
how do group incentive plans solve the so-called l/N problem (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972;
Holmstrom, 1982a)? Social psychologists and sociologists, however, have long emphasized the
importance of informal norms in influencing behavior in groups.
Some arguments involving norms have the “over-socialized” character (i.e., norms so
strong that no room remains for individual choice) that economists have found troubling, but
subtler arguments are also available, Granovetter (1985:486), for example, argues that “culture is
not a once-for-all influence but an ongoing process, continuously constructed and reconstructed
during interaction. It not only shapes its mem~rs but also is shaped by them, in part for their
own strategic reason s.” Tirole’s (1996) analysis of corruption has something of this flavor;
similar analyses of useful rather than destructive cultures should also be possible.
Economists have just begun to think about groups in organizations, but even the
seemingly small step of adding a third actor to the classic agent y model (i,e., a supervisor, as
well as a principal and an agent) opens new horizons, as Tirole (1986) showed in his seminal
analysis of collusion. All three actors in Tirole’s model have the conventional preferences for
actors in an economic model. More recently, other theorists have begun to explore preferences
10 Hallock (1995) studies a related issue: ~iprocity via interlocking directorates (i,e., the CEO of firm A is a
dirwtor of firm B, and vice versa). Hatlock finds that, after controlling for firm characteristics, interlocking
directorates are associated with no more than 10 ~rcent higher pay.16
drawn from the social psychology and sociology literatures: see Kandel and Lazem (1992) and
Barron and Gjerde (forthcoming) on peer pressure and Rotemberg (1994) on altruism in the
workplace. Gaynor and Rebitzer (1995) deserve s~ial recognition for not only developing a
model involving group norms but also trying to test it!
2. Careers in Organizations
Virtually all of the foregoing theory and evidence on incentive pay was cast as occurring
within a firm, but much of it could just as well have been cast as between firms. In this section I
step more resolutely inside the firm, by focusing on careers in organizations. Most of he
evidence I report concerns white-collar workers, especially managerial and professional workers.
Most of the work settings that generated the data are similar to the idealized employment system
Osterman (1987) calls “salaried” (as opposed to “industrial,” “craft,” or “secondary”).
I will treat jobs as defined in advance, independent of the people who fill them. This
assumption may seem unremarkable, but some firms have no jobs of this kind (Kaftan and
Barnes, 1991) and some firms with many highly formalized jobs nonetheless have an important
minority of jobs that do not fit this description (Miner, 1987). I will also largely treat jobs as
defined for individuals, rather than for teams, in spite of the recent surge of interest in the latter
(e.g., Katzenbach and Smith, 1993).
One might think that, having sidestepped these fashionable issues in job design, I would
be reduced to discussing a mature body of theory and evidence focused on a somewhat outdated
definition of a job. Unfortunately, the situation is not that good, Instead, I see this section, like
the second half of the first section, as an attempt to survey an emerging literature—this time on
jobs, and how they are strung into careers in organizations. I begin with evidence, then turn to
theory, and finally suggest some new dimensions.
A. Evidence
In this sub-section I descrik a wide range of findings concerning wages, promotions,
and performance evaluations inside firms. I attempt to assess which findings are true in a vtiety
of environments and which may be limited to narrower settings such as a particular firm,
industry, or occupation, Most of the evidence I present concerns white-collar, salaried workers
employed by large US firms. Nonetheless, the literature is large and varied. I therefore consider
only four categories of evidence: positions, wages, the interplay between positions and wages,
and performance evaluation. Even in a fairly narrow category such as positions, however, it is
difficult to compare and evaluate some of tie findings. Different authors have asked different
questions of seemingly comparable datasets. It would be very helpful if authors of future studies17
would address a common core of questions before turning to spmific issues of their own
interest. Indeed, the same could be said of the existing studies: it would be very helpful if these
authors would return to their data to address remaining core questions. To prompt discussion, I
propose a set of such core questions at the end of this sub-section.
1) Posifions: The first, simple finding is that demotions are rare. This is intuitive but
rarely documented, in part because defining a demotion requires that jobs be ordered. One way
to order jobs is by ranking their wages (Lazear, 1992); another is via patterns in observed job
transitions (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom, 1994a); a third is to ask whether formal job ladders
exist (Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby, 1986) and are used (DiPrete, 1987). Relatively few
studies produce job orderings; as far as I know, only Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (hereafter
BGH) document the unsurprising fact that demotions are rare.
Much more attention has been paid to promotions (which again require jobs to be ordered
by some method). In particular, serial correlation in promotion rates (i.e., a “fast track”) has
been studied extensively (Rosenbaum, 1984; Bri.iderl, Diekmann, and Preisendorfer, 1991;
BGH, 1994a; Spileman and Petersen, 1993; Spilerman and Ishida, 1994; and Podolny and
Baron, 1995). There has also been some analysis of the hazard rate for job-to-job transitions
within a fm (Felmlee, 1982; Althauser and Kalleberg, 1990; and Lazea, 1992). This work
varies in its sensitivity to issues such as competing risks (e.g., promotion versus exit, or up
versus across job ladders) and unobserved heterogeneity. It also varies in its conclusions:
Felmlee and Althauser-Kalleberg find positive duration dependence (i.e., an increasing escape
rate to another job in the fm as time on the current job increases), whereas hzear finds
negative.
The natural extension of work on fast tracks and hazard rates is to analyze more detailed
information from the history of a worker’s job assignments within a firm, such as the following
analysis by Chiappori, Salani&, and Valentin (1996). Consider two workers who begin in level 1
at date 1 and are both in level 2 at date 3. Suppose worker A was promoted between dates 1 and
2, whereas worker B was promoted between dates 2 and 3. One can ask which worker fares
better after date 3. As predicted by a learning model akin to Harris and Holmstrom (1982),
Chiappori er. al. find that worker B fares better after date 3.11
2) Wages: Using administrative records to study salaried managers during their careers ~
a single firm, BGH (1994b) find that nominal wage cuts are extremely rare (200 observations out
of more than 60,000), but that zero nominal increases are not. It would be interesting to use large
11 At first blush, this finding may seem inconsistent with the existence of a fast track. The Chiappori e[, al.
finding could be compatible with a fast track, however, becauw some fret-trackers may not be eligible for the
sample constructed by Chiappori et. al,: workers A and B are at level 2 at date 3, but a true fast-tracker may atready18
panel datasets to study the generality of these findings across firms, but such efforts must
confront several issues. First, for non-salaried workers, fluctuations in hours (e.g., via
overtime) would change earnings even if wages were constant. Second, there may be substantial
measurement error in earnings or wages. Third, there may be measurement error in firm
affiliation, clouding the question of who stayed with the firm.
Card and Hyslop (1995) confront these issues using data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) covering hourly workers who
stayd with their employer for two consecutive interview dates. Card and Hyslop’s findings are
qualitatively similar to BGH’s: nominal wage cuts are rare (but not as rare as in BGH), but zero
nominal increases are not (indeed, they form a prominent spike in the distribution). Kahn (1994)
presents similar evidence. Card and Hyslop, Kahn, BGH (1994b), and McLaughlin (1994) all
find that real wage cuts are not rare.
Taking a cue from the large literature on fast tracks, BGH (1994b) ask the analogous
question about wages: is there serial correlation in wage changes? They find that the correlation
between Aw, (= w, - w,.]) and Aw,.l is .30, and between Aw, and Aw,.z is .25. Of course, this
finding could reflect concave effects of experience and/or tenure, so BGH compute the analogous
correlations for changes in wage residuals rather than in wages. These correlations are indeed
smaller: .17 and .12, respectively.
As with wage cuts, there has been some analysis of the serial correlation of wage changes
(and changes in wage residuals) using lmge panel datasets, Using data on American scientists,
Lillard and Weiss (1979) find statistically significant person effects in both the level and the
growth of earnings residuals, as well as a significant correlation between the two. Similarly,
Hause (1980) finds significant person effects in the growth of earnings among young Swedish
males. Akwd and Card (1989), however, analyze three larger and more heterogeneous datasets .
(the PSID, the National Longitudinal Survey, and the Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance
Experiment) and cannot reject a statistical model that has no person effect in the growth mte of
(experience-adjusted) earnings.
Workers in the Lillard-Weiss, Hause, and Abowd-Card samples did not necessarily
remain with a single employer, as was the case in BGH, but Topel (1991) and Topel and Ward
(1992) study within-fro wage growth. Both papers find that within-firm changes in wage
residuals are serially uncorrelated, using data from the PSID and S~ial Security earnings
records, respectively. Topel and Ward also find, however, that prior wage growth affects job
have been promoted to level 3 by this date. This is one example of how it would be useful for past, present, ti
future authors to address a core set of questions before turning to issues specific to their paper.19
mobility, even after controlling for the current wage—a finding that would be easily explained by
person effects in wage growth.
In sum, three small, relatively homogeneous samples (BGH, Lillard-Weiss, and Hause)
find evidence of a person effect in the growth rate of earnings, whereas five large, heterogenmus
samples (three from Abowd-Cad, one (related) from Topel, and one from Topel-Ward) do not.
This welter of findings deserves further attention. One possible explanation is that only certain
small groups of workers (such as the managerial and professional workers in BGH and Lillard-
Weiss) exhibit such a person effect. If most groups of workers do not exhibit this effect then the
representative cross-sections in Abowd-Card, Topel, and Topel-Ward would not either.
Finally, BGH (1994b) find that a difference in the starting wages of two cohorts persists
as the cohorts age. Put differently, raises for workers already in the fm me highly correlated,
regardless of cohort, so much of the wage difference ktween two cohorts comes from the
difference in their starting wages. This finding is reminiscent of Doeringer and Piore’s (1971)
description of how an internal labor market buffers workers from the vagaries of the external
market, and of Beaud~ and DiNardo’s (1991) evidence on the effect of previous unemployment
rates on current wages (although Beau@ and DiNardo find that the lowest unemployment rate
since being hired has the largest effect, rather than the unemployment rate at the date hired).
3) Positions and Wages: Just as the first, simple finding on positions was that demotions
are rare, the first, simple finding on wages and positions is that the wage increase upon
promotion is larger than for those not promoted. For example, in a study of 461 top executives in
72 large US manufacturing firms from 1964 to 1981, Murphy (1985) found that the average real
increase in salary plus bonus for the whole sample was 3.790 but the average increase for a Vice
President promoted to President was 20.9%, and for a President promoted to CEO 14.3%. On
the other hand, the wage change at promotion can be small compared to the difference in average
wages between the two levels. For’example, Murphy found that the average salary plus bonus
for Presidents was 60% higher than for Vice Presidents (but only 13% higher for CEOS than for
Presidents). BGH (1994b) replicate these results for lower-level managers in one fm: wage
increases upon promotion are larger than for those not promoted, but smaller than the difference
in average wages between the two levels,
In keeping with the findings of serial correlation in promotion rates and in wage changes,
BGH (1994b) find that wage increases forecast promotions, That is, among all the workers just
promoted to level n, the next raise is lower for those who subsequently wait longer to be
promoted to level n+l.
BGH (1994a) find that promotions come disproportionately from the upper deciles of the
wage distribution for the lower job, but not exclusively: some promotions come from each
decile. Similarly, some promotions go into each decile of the wage distribution for the upper job,20
although most go into the lower deciles. At higher job levels, a larger fraction of promotions
come from the upper deciles of the lower job and go into the lower deciles of the upper job.
Murphy (199 1) describes the official schedule of wage-increase ranges at Merck & Co.:
controlling for performance evaluation, wage increases are smaller for those who begin in higher
qJartiles of the wage distribution of a given job level. BGH (1994a) replicate and extend this
finding: in the firm they study, the fact holds for those who are not promoted, for those who are,
and for the sample as a whole.
4) Performance Evaluations: Much of what we know about the relationship between
wages and performance evaluations is drawn from two influential papers by Medoff and
Abraham (1980, 198 1). They study managerial and professional workers in three firms and
report three basic facts: wages increase with seniority; wages increase with performance
evaluation; and the effect of seniority on wages is essentially independent of the presence of
controls for performance evaluation. An implication of these three facts (borne out in their data)
is that performance evaluation is essentially independent of seniority. All of this might cause one
to question the role of performance evaluation, but Medoff and Abraham find that increases in
performance evaluation predict raises and promotions. Gibbs (1995) presents similar evidence on
the effects of performance evaluations in the fm studied by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom
(1994a,b).
Waldman and Avolio (1986) conduct a meta-anal ysis of 40 samples, largely from the
literature in industrial psychology. Waldman and Avolio find that productivity increases with age
but performance evaluation is essentially flat with age. Replacing “productivity” with “wage” and
“age” with “seniority” makes the two Waldman-Avolio findings identical to two of the Medoff-
Abraham findings.
5) Summary: There is a large and diverse set of findings concerning wage and promotion
dynamics within firms. Some of the findings have so far been documented only in individual
firms, but I have attempted to report evidence from large panel datasets whenever possible. 1[
would be a great service if empirical researchers would provide evidence on a core set of
questions before studying specific issues of their own. Among these core questions might be: (1)
is there a fast track?, (2) are nominal wage cuts rare?, (3) are changes in wage residuals serially
correlated?, (4) are there cohort effects in wages?, (5) are wage increases upon promotion large
compared to normal wage changes but small compared to the difference in average wages
between the two levels?, (6) do wage increases forecast promotions?, (7) do promotions come
from and go to all the dwiles of the wage distributions for the lower and upper levels?, (8) are
wage increases smaller for those who begin in higher quartiles of the wage distribution for that
level?, (9) do wages increase and are promotions more likely with higher performance
evaluations (both in cross-section and in time-series)?, and (10) is the effect of seniority on21
wages independent of the presence of controls for performance evaluation? Thwreticd
researchers, for their part, could advance the literature by developing models that address broad
patterns of facts, abandoning the more common strategy of developing a model to explain one or
a few findings in isolation.
B, Towards a Theoq
There are at least four potential building blocks for a theory of wage and promotion
dynamics within fms: task assignment, tournaments, on-the-job human-capital acquisition, and
learning. Each of these building blocks has received some development in the literature, but
many of tie resulting models were designed to explain at most a few stylized facts. I will
therefore briefly describe some of the major contributions to these four literatures, indicating
some of the facts each was designed to explain. I will then argue, however, that future thmrizing
should aim at explaining broad patterns of evidence rather than a fact or two, and I will give
examples of recent theorizing in this vein.
1) Task Assignnzenr: The task-assignment literature begins with static, full-information
models (Sattinger, 1975; Rosen, 1982; Waldman, 1984a) that offer an explanation for skewness
in the wage distribution; see Sattinger (1993) for a review. A new line of research emphasizes
that the firm’s decision to assign a worker to a new task signals information to prospective
employers about the worker’s productive ability ~aldman, 1984b; Ricart i Costa, 1988;
Bemhardt and Scoones, 1993). This signaling effect offers an explanation for the large wage
increase upon promotion. Because prospective employers bid up the wage of promoted workers,
however, the current employer chooses an inefficiently tough promotion criterion: workers who
would be marginally more productive in the new job are not enough more productive to
compensate for the wage increase.
2) Tournaments: The tournaments literature begins with the classic analysis by Lazear and
Rosen (198 1) that offers an explanation for large wage increases upon promotion. Rosen’s
(1986) sequential-elimination model shows that a big prize at the end (such as promotion to
CEO) has important effects on incentives in the early rounds, so the distribution of prizes can be
quite convex and yet create constant incentives across rounds. Meyer (1992) shows that in a
sequence of (non-elimination) tournaments it is efficient to introduce second-round bias in favor
of the first-round winner. (A small second-round bias causes a second-order reduction in
second-round effort but a first-order increase in first-round effort.) Thus, a fast track can emerge
from an optimal incentive scheme.
3) Human Cqital: From the perspective of careers in organizations, the human-capital
literature moves from Becker (1962) to Hashimoto (1981) to Carmichael (1983). Becker
suggested that the firm and the worker will share both the costs and the benefits of investments in22
specific capital. Hashimoto emphasized that such sharing would not be necess~ if the fm and
the worker did not have private information about post-investment match quality. In the presence
of such private information, however, the optimal sharing rule produces inefficient turnover.
Carmichael made the first explicit reference to careers in organizations by showing that a
promotion ladder (i.e., wages attached to jobs, with jobs assigned by seniority) can induce
investment and produce efficient turnover.
More recently, Kahn and Huberman (1988), Waldman (1990), and Prendergast (1993)
built on Carmichael’s insight to analyze promotion and up-or-out rules. Others have
reinvestigated the Becker-Hashimoto sharing model. Chang and Wang (1996), for example,
derive a host of new results, including underinvestrnent in general human capital, in the
(plausible) case in which human-capital investments cannot be observed by prospective
employers. And Prendergast (1989), Acemoglu and Pischke (1996), and Chang and Wang
(1995) show that the interaction of investment and turnover can create multiple equilibria: if
almost no one will be laid off then it is efficient to invest, so almost no one is laid off, and vice
versa.
4) Qarning: I organize the literature on learning about workers into four categories:
passive response, active experimentation, commitment problems, and strategic information
transmission. Jovanovic (1979) and MacDonald (1982) are classic examples from the passive-
response catego~—information (say, about a worker’s productivity) arrives and the fm
responds optimally (say, by changing the worker’s wage). Murphy (1986) develops two
models-one emphasizing passive learning, the other incentives—and tests their distinctive
predictions. Murphy’s evidence is inconclusive, perhaps because both models are actually at
work in the data, but his paper is noteworthy for its attempt to distinguish between competing
reasons why pay might be linked to performance. O’Flaherty and Siow (1992, 1995) use a
passive-learning model to study up-or-out rules.
Meyer (199 1) falls in the active-experimentation category: in a sequence of contests
(similar to Meyer (1992), described above, but with learning about worker ability rather than
moral hazard), the firm finds it optimal to bias the second round in favor of the first-round
winner, (Without a second-round bias either the f~st-round winner wins the second round,
merely confirming the first-round information, or the first-round loser wins, canceling out the
first-round information.) Thus, as in Meyer (1992), a firm may find it optimal to create a fast
track.
Harris and Holmstrom (1982) show how learning can cause commitment problems. A
risk-neutral firm would like to guuantee a risk-averse worker a constant wage, but information
about the worker’s performance may cause prospective employers to bid up the worker’s wage.
If the current employer cannot bind the worker to the fm then only those workers with poor23
performances will be left working at the guaranteed wage. Consequently, the fm can offer only
limited insurance (in the form of a guaranteed wage) and must collect a premium for it up front
(in the form of a wage below expected productivity during the time before performance
information arrives).
Finally, Greenwald (1986), Lazear (1986 b), and the signaling papers noted above in the
task-assignment literature analyze s~ategic information transmission. Greenwald studies the
winner’s curse that afflicts a prospective employer when making an offer; Lazea considers the
possibility that the prospective employer may have superior information, in which case workers
who never get offers are stigmatized. Gibbons and Katz (199 1) develop a similar model of
layoffs and present evidence consistent with the model: for white-collar workers (who are less
likely to be subject to inverse-seniority layoff rules), the re-employment wages of laid-off
workers are lower than those of observationally equivalent workers displaced in plant closings,
consistent with a layoff being a bad signal about the worker’s ability,
5) Beyond building blocks: These four literatures—task assignment, tournaments, human
capital, and learning-have developd some important theory and met with some empirical
success. In the last few years, however, a new style of theory on career dynamics has begun to
emerge, in which models speak to broad patterns of facts rather than one or a few in isolation.
Harris and Holmstrom (1982), MacLeod and Malcomson (1988), Demougin and Siow (1994)
and Bemhmd t (1995) are contributions in this vein. I will briefly describe Gibbons and Waldman
(1996), because it makes the broadest attempt to relate to a detailed pattern of facts about careers
in organizations.
Waldman and I develop a model that blends task assignment, on-the-job human capital
acquisition, and learning. The predictions of the model are consistent with much of the evidence
on positions, wages, and positions and wages describd in the previous sub-section, including:
(1) both demotions and (real) wage decreases will be rare, although demotions will k much
more rare; (2) on average, workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one
level of a job ladder will be promoted more quickly to the next level; (3) promotions will be
associated with large wage increases, but these wage increases will be small relative to the
difference between avemge wages across the relevant job levels; (4) there will be significant
serial correlation in both wage increases and promotion rates; and (5) individuals promoted from
one job level to the next will come disproportionately (but not exclusively) from the top of the
lower job’s wage distribution and will arrive disproportionately (but not exclusively) towards the
bottom of the higher job’s wage distribution, Furthermore, the model is also consistent with the
fourth category of evidence, on performance evaluations.
The main elements of the model are simple. A worker with innate ability 6 and labor-
market experience x has productive ability T(6, x). A worker’s innate ability can be either high or24
low; experience improves a worker’s productivity through learning by doing. There are three
jobs, which differ in their sensitivity to productive ability. Under full information, workers with
high values of q would be assigned to the top job, workers with intermediate values of q to the
middle job, and workers with low values of ~ to the bottom job. With imperfect information
about innate ability, workers are assigned to jobs based on their expected productive abilities and
paid their expected outputs in their assigned jobs.
In each period, a worker’s output provides a noisy signal about his or her productive
ability. Because labor-mmket experience is observable, the signal about productive ability can be
translated into a signal about innate ability. Growth in productive ability with experience implies
that, on average, workers progress up the job ladder, receiving wage increases every period and
promotions every so often. But learning about innate ability implies that wage cuts sometimes
occur; indeed, demotions, while rare, are possible. Serial correlation in promotion rates and
wage increases follow from the differences in innate ability, as does the finding that wage
increases forecast promotion. Large wage increases at promotion follow in pm from a selmtion
effect: those who get promoted in a given period are disproportionately those who received good
news about their abilities. Finally, the findings on performance evaluations follow if it is innate
ability ((3)rather than productive ability (q) or realized output that is evaluated; that is, evaluators
adjust realized output for the skill acquired with experience.
The Gibbons-Waldman model (and others like it) address broad patterns of facts about
careers in organizations, Nonetheless, each existing model fails to produce some of the existing
facts. There are four main facts that do not emerge from the Gibbons-Waldman model: nominal
wage cuts are rare (but see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) for a theory of nominal rigidity),
wage differences between cohorts are primarily a function of differences in their starting wages,
wage increases are smaller for those who begin in higher quartiles, and wage distributions for
different job levels overlap (although this last fact could be due to excessively coarse job
definitions in some datasets). Of course, some of these existing “facts” have not yet been
established beyond a single firm, hence my appeal for systematic empirical analysis of core
questions.
C. New Dimensions
Sociologists have long explored the effects of aggregate-level variables such as vacancy
chains, social networks, and organizational demography on individual-level outcomes such as
attainment and turnover. It would b interesting to consider whether the theoretical or
econometric tools of labor economics can shed any new light on the sociologists’ prefemed
interpretations of these effects.25
White (1970), for example, introduced and explored the consequences of vacancy chains:
if worker A gets promoted from job 2 to job 3, it creates an opportunity for worker B to be
promoted from job 1 to job 2. The basic idea is not startling, but it is sensible; see Stewman
(1986) for elaborations. Demougin and Siow (1994) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) have made
nice starts towards incorporating such demand-side effects into theoretical models in labor
economics.
Granovetter (1974) analyzed the importance of friends and relatives as sources of
information for job-seekers. More recently, Burt (1992) and Podolny and Baron (1995) have
studied analogous networks within firms, asking how the size and interconnectedness of an
individual’s net work influences the individud’s promotion prospects. Burt gives special
prominence to the idea of a “structural hole,” where worker A knows several workers of type B
and several of type C, but no B worker knows a C worker. The existing smiological research
largely treats networks as exogenous and asks what they do. This approach has already migrated
into the economics literature; see Montgomery (199 1), for example. But if certain network forms
are advantageous, such as Burt’s structural hole, then it would be interesting to consider under
what circumstances such networks might be formed or modified endogenously.
Finally, Pfeffer (1983) pioneered the study of “organizational demography” by
suggesting how the distributions of individual attributes (such as age, sex, race, education level,
and seniority) within an organization or work group might influence outcomes such as
innovation, productivity, satisfaction, and turnover. A large empirical literature now exists.
Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly (1984), for example, study turnover in 599 top-management
groups in 31 Fortune 500 firms. In a logistic regression on individual turnover, including
controls for the individual’s age and the firm’s performance, the extent to which the individual is
similar in age to other group members decreases the chance of turnover.
3. Conclusion
I hope to have shown that labor economics has made some progress towards
understanding two limited aspects of employment relationships: incentive pay and careers in
organizations. Several other concrete questions also deserve attention, including job design, skill
development, and participative decision-making. A more fundamental and abstract question also
needs work: what is an employment relationship? The classic papers by Simon (1951) and
Williamson, Wachter, and Harris (1975) provide good starts. An ideal answer to this
fundamental question would also shed light on some of the concrete issues—incentives, job
design, and the like.26
Much of the theory and evidence I have described is geared towards white-collar workers
(especially managers and professionals) in large US firms. That is, I have focused on
Osterman’s (1987) “salaried” employment system, rather than the “industrial,” “craft,” or
“secondary” employment systems. All four systems deserve more attention, as do systems (and
their institutions) in other countries and from other eras.
One view is that economics is abut markets, so labor economics should focus on the
labor market, leaving the study of what goes on inside firms to fields such as human resource
management, industrial relations, organizational psychology, and organizational sociology.
Obviously, I disagree: I think labor economics has too many theoretical and empirical tools at its
disposal to make such an allocation of attention socially optimal. At the same time, I hope to have
suggested several areas in which labor economics could benefit from an exchange of theory and
evidence with the many other fields that study employment relationships.
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